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Using Shafer and Vovk’s game-theoretic framework, we derive a capital asset pricing model from an eﬃcient market
hypothesis, with no assumptions about the beliefs or preferences of investors. Our eﬃcient market hypothesis says that a
speculator with limited means cannot beat a particular index by a substantial factor. The model we derive says that the
diﬀerence between the average returns of a portfolio and the index should approximate, with high lower probability,
the diﬀerence between the portfolio’s covariance with the index and the index’s variance. This leads to interesting new ways
to evaluate the past performance of portfolios and funds.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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economic ideas, especially marginal utilities for current and future consumption [1,2]. Twenty years of work
have demonstrated the power and ﬂexibility of the combination; many diﬀerent stochastic models and many
diﬀerent models for investors’ marginal utility have been introduced and used. There is little consensus, how-
ever, concerning the empirical validity of these diﬀerent instantiations of the theory.
In this article, we take a more parsimonious approach to capital asset pricing, using the game-theoretic
framework advanced in [3]. In its simplest form, this framework uses a two-player perfect-information sequen-
tial game. In each round, Player I can buy uncertain payoﬀs at given prices, and then Player II determines the
values of the payoﬀs. The game, a precise and purely mathematical object, is connected to the world by an
auxiliary nonmathematical hypothesis, Cournot’s principle. Cournot’s principle says that if Player I avoids
risking bankruptcy, then he cannot multiply his initial capital in the game by a large factor. This principle
gives empirical meaning to the game-theoretic forms of the classical limit theorems of probability, which
say that certain approximations or limits hold unless Player I is allowed to become very rich.0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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The prices oﬀered to Player I at the beginning of a round may fall short of determining probabilities for Player
II’s move, but they always determine upper and lower probabilities. Markov’s inequality of probability theory
says that a gambler’s chance of multiplying the amount he risks by 1/a is never more than a, so that when a
strategy guarantees multiplying one’s capital by 1/a provided an event A happens, the probability of Amust be
a or less. The intuition associated with Markov’s inequality is available even when there are no probabilities in
our picture, and it leads us to deﬁne the upper probability PA for a set A of possible values for Player II’s
move as the reciprocal of the greatest factor by which Player I can be sure of multiplying his capital without
risking bankruptcy if A happens ([3, p. 187]). Lower probabilities are then deﬁned by PA ¼ 1 PAc, where Ac
is the complement of A. When enough payoﬀs are priced to determine a probability for A, PA and PA both
equal this probability ([3, p. 181]). The same principles lead to upper and lower probabilities for the whole
sequence of Player II’s moves if prices for all rounds are speciﬁed in advance. If prices are given by a player
in the game as the game proceeds, we obtain upper and lower joint probabilities for the prices and Player II’s
moves ([3, p. 70]).
A ﬁnancial market provides a game of the required form: Player I is a speculator, who may buy various
securities at set prices at the beginning of each trading period, and Player II is the market, which determines
the securities’ returns at the end of the period. If we measure Player I’s capital relative to a particular market
index, then Cournot’s principle becomes an eﬃcient market hypothesis: Player I cannot beat the index by a
large factor while avoiding risk of bankruptcy. In this article, we show that this eﬃcient market hypothesis
gives a high lower probability to an approximate relation between an investor’s actual returns and the index’s
actual returns (Eq. (6) in Section 1.4) that resembles the equation for the security market line (an exact relation
between theoretical quantities) in the classical Sharpe–Lintner capital asset pricing model [4–6]. Because of the
resemblance, we call our model the game-theoretic CAPM.
While not contradicting the Sharpe–Lintner CAPM, the game-theoretic CAPM diﬀers from it radically in
spirit. To avoid confusion, we need to keep three important aspects of the diﬀerence in view:
(1) We make no assumptions whatsoever about the preferences or beliefs of investors.
(2) We do not assume that asset returns are determined by a stochastic process. These returns are deter-
mined by the market, a player in our game. The market may act as it pleases, except that our eﬃcient
market hypothesis predicts it will not allow spectacular success for any particular investment strategy
that does not risk bankruptcy.
(3) The predictions of our model concern the relation between the actual returns of an investor (or the actual
returns of a security or portfolio) and the actual returns of an index. These predictions are precise
enough to be conﬁrmed or falsiﬁed by the actual returns, without any further modeling assumptions.
In this article, we check the predictions for several securities, and we ﬁnd that they are usually correct.
The empirical success of our predictions, though modest, constitutes a challenge to the established theory.
In spite of its parsimony, the game-theoretic CAPM can make reasonably precise and reasonably correct pre-
dictions concerning the relation between average return and empirical volatility and covariance. Can the
established theory deliver enough more to give credibility to its much stronger assumptions?
Our results can also be seen as a clariﬁcation of the roles of investors and speculators. An investor balances
risk and return in an eﬀort to balance present and future consumption, while a speculator is intent on beating
the market. The established theory emphasizes the role of investors, but the eﬃcient market hypothesis is usu-
ally justiﬁed by the presumed eﬀectiveness of speculators. Speculators have already put so much eﬀort into
beating the market, the argument goes, that no opportunities remain for a new speculator who has no private
information. The classical CAPM, still the most widely used instantiation of the established theory, bases its
security market line, a relationship between expected return and covariance with the market, on the investor’s
eﬀort to balance return with volatility, perceived as a measure of risk. Our game-theoretic CAPM, in contrast,
shows that this relationship between return and covariance arises already from the speculator’s elimination of
opportunities to beat the market. So the relationship by itself does not provide any evidence that volatility
measures risk, that it is perceived by the investor as doing so, or even that it can be predicted by the investor
in advance.
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something entirely new: a new way of evaluating the past performance of portfolios and investors. According
to our theory, the underperformance of a portfolio relative to the market index should be approximated by
one-half the empirical variance of the diﬀerence between the return for the portfolio and the return for the
index. We call this quantity the theoretical performance deﬁcit (see Eq. (8)). In the case of an investor or fund
whose strategy cannot be sold short because it is not public information, the theoretical performance deﬁcit
should be a lower bound on the underperformance. Because a variance can be decomposed in many ways, the
identiﬁcation of the theoretical performance deﬁcit opens the door to a plethora of new ways to analyze
underperformance.
Because the game-theoretic apparatus in which our formal mathematical results are stated will be unfamil-
iar to most readers, and because these results include necessarily messy bounds on the errors in our approx-
imations, we devote most of this article to informal statements and explanations. We state our results
informally in Section 1, and we explain the geometric intuition underlying them in Section 2. We introduce
our game-theoretic framework only in Section 3. We state our results precisely in that framework in Section
4, illustrate how they can be applied to data in Section 5, and summarize their potential importance in Section
6. Appendix A provides more information about game-theoretic upper and lower probability, and Appendix B
provides proofs of the propositions stated in Section 4.
For brevity, we avoid using upper and lower probabilities explicitly in the propositions stated in Section 4.
Instead we express the inequality PðAÞP 1 a ðor PðAcÞ 6 aÞ by saying that ‘‘A is predicted at level a’’. But
we do use lower probability in one of the proofs in Appendix B, because this allows us to use a simple result
from [3].
1. An informal ﬁrst look
In this section we state the game-theoretic CAPM informally, say a few words about its derivation and its
resemblance to the classical CAPM, and then explain how it leads to the theoretical performance deﬁcit.
1.1. Average return and covariance
Consider a particular ﬁnancial market and a particular market index m in which investors and speculators
can trade. We assume that a speculator with limited means cannot beat the performance of m by a substantial
factor; this is our eﬃcient market hypothesis for m.
The game-theoretic CAPM for m (or long–short CAPM, as we sometimes call it), which follows from this
hypothesis, says that if s is a security (or portfolio or other trading strategy) that can be sold short, then its
average simple return, say ls, is approximated byls  lm  r2m þ rsm; ð1Þ
where lm is the average simple return for the index m, r2m is the uncentered empirical variance of m’s simple
returns, and rsm is the uncentered empirical covariance of s’s and m’s simple returns. In order to make (1) into
a mathematically precise statement, we must, of course, spell out just how close together ls and lm  r2m þ rsm
will be. We do this in Proposition 3.
If s cannot be sold short, then we obtain onlyls/ lm  r2m þ rsm: ð2Þ
This approximate inequality is made precise by Proposition 1. We call (2) the long game-theoretic CAPM for
m.
We can also write (1) in the formls  ðlm  r2mÞ þ r2mbs; ð3Þ
where bs represents the ratio rsm=r2m. We call the line l ¼ ðlm  r2mÞ þ r2mb in the (b,l)-plane the security mar-
ket line for the game-theoretic CAPM. We call bs the sensitivity of s to m; it is the slope of the empirical regres-
sion through the origin of s’s returns on m’s returns.
178 V. Vovk, G. Shafer / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 49 (2008) 175–1971.2. The empirical nature of the model
All the quantities in (1) are empirical: we are considering N trading periods, during which s has returns
s1, . . ., sN and m has returns m1, . . ., mN, and we have setls :¼
1
N
XN
n¼1
sn; lm :¼
1
N
XN
n¼1
mn;
r2m :¼
1
N
XN
n¼1
m2n; rsm :¼
1
N
XN
n¼1
snmn:
ð4ÞThe sn and mn are simple returns; sn is the total gain or loss (capital gain or loss plus dividends and redistri-
butions) during period n from investing one monetary unit in s at the beginning of that period, and mn is sim-
ilarly the total gain or loss for m.
Our theory does not posit the existence of theoretical quantities that are estimated by the empirical quan-
tities ls; lm; r
2
m, and rsm, and there is nothing in our theory that requires these empirical quantities to be pre-
dictable in advance or stable over time.
Mathematical convenience in the development of our theory dictates that we use the uncentered deﬁnitions
in (4) for r2m and rsm, so that bs is the slope of the empirical linear regression through the origin. Numerically,
however, we can expect (3) to remain valid if we use the centered counterparts of r2m and rsm, so that bs is the
slope of the usual empirical linear regression with a constant term, because there is usually little numerical
diﬀerence between uncentered and centered empirical moments in the case of returns. The uncentered empir-
ical variance r2m is related to its centered counterpart,
1
N
P
nðmn  lmÞ2, by the identity1
N
X
n
ðmn  lmÞ2 ¼ r2m  l2m:Because lm is usually of the same order of magnitude as r2m (see Section 5), and because both are usually small,
l2m will usually be much smaller and hence negligible compared to r
2
m. Similarly,1
N
X
n
ðsn  lsÞðmn  lmÞ ¼ rsm  lslm;and lslm will also be negligible compared to r2m. So a shift to the centered quantities will also make little dif-
ference in the ratio rsm=r2m.
1.3. Why?
Proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 are provided in Appendix B, and the geometric intuition underlying them is
explained in Section 2. It may be helpful, however, to say a word here about the main idea.
Our starting point is the fact that the growth of an investment in s is best gauged not by its simple returns sn
but by its logarithmic returns ln(1 + sn) (see, e.g., [7, p. 11]). If we invest one unit in s at the beginning of the N
periods, reinvest all dividends as we proceed, and write Ws for the resulting wealth at the end of N periods,
then1
N
lnW s ¼ 1N ln
YN
n¼1
ð1þ snÞ ¼ 1N
XN
n¼1
lnð1þ snÞ:So the Taylor expansion lnð1þ xÞ  x 1
2
x2 yields1
N
lnW s  1N
XN
n¼1
sn  1
2
s2n
 
¼ ls 
1
2
r2s : ð5ÞWe call 1N lnW  l 12 r2 the fundamental approximation of asset pricing. It shows us that investors and spec-
ulators should be concerned with volatility even if volatility does not measure risk, for volatility diminishes the
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indiﬀerence curves in the (r,l)-plane for a speculator who is concerned only with ﬁnal wealth. As we explain in
Sections 2.2 and 2.4, we can reason about these indiﬀerence curves in much the same way as the classical
CAPM reasons about an investor’s mean-variance indiﬀerence curves (see, e.g., [6, pp. 195–198]), with similar
results.
The imprecision of the approximations (1) and (2) arises partly from the imprecision of the fundamental
approximation and partly from the imprecision of our eﬃcient market hypothesis. We assume only that
the market cannot be beat by a substantial factor, not that it cannot be beat at all.
1.4. Resemblance to the classical CAPM
If we set lf :¼ lm  r2m, then we can rewrite (1) in the form
ls  lf þ ðlm  lf Þ
rsm
r2m
: ð6ÞThis resembles the classical CAPM, which can be written asEðeRsÞ ¼ Rf þ ðEðeRmÞ  Rf Þ CovðeRs; eRmÞ
VarðeRmÞ ; ð7Þwhere Rf is the risk-free rate of return, and eRs and eRm are random variables whose realizations are the simple
returns sn and mn, respectively (see [6], Eq. (7.9) on p. 197). But it diﬀers from the classical CAPM in three
ways:
(1) It replaces theoretical expected values, variances, and covariances with empirical quantities. (The game-
theoretic model has no probability measure and therefore no such theoretical quantities.)
(2) It replaces an exact equation between theoretical quantities with an approximate equation between
empirical quantities, with a precise error bound derived from the fundamental approximation and an
eﬃcient market hypothesis.
(3) It replaces the risk-free rate of return with lm  r2m.
The two equations also diﬀer fundamentally in what they can claim to accomplish. Because the left-hand
side of the classical equation, Eq. (7), is the expected value of s’s future return, we might imagine an investor
using this equation to predict s’s future price. This is a fantasy, because the theoretical expected value, vari-
ance, and covariance on the right hand side of the equation are not known to the investor (one could question
whether they even exist in any useful sense), but this fantasy motivates some of the interest in the equation; it
may even be responsible for the name ‘‘capital asset pricing model’’. In contrast, Eq. (6) clearly does not pre-
dict individual prices. It predicts only how s’s price changes over time will be related, on average, to those for
the market. It tells how the average of s’s returns will be related to their empirical covariance with returns on
the market.
1.5. The theoretical performance deﬁcit
If we writeWm for the ﬁnal wealth resulting from an initial investment of one unit in the index m andWs for
the ﬁnal wealth of a particular investor who also begins with one unit capital, then1
N
lnW m  1N lnW s 
FA
lm 
1
2
r2m
 
 ls 
1
2
r2s
 
CAPM 1
2
r2s  rsm þ
1
2
r2m ¼
1
2
r2sm:Here FA indicates use of the fundamental approximation, 1N lnW  l 12r2, and CAPM indicates use of the
game-theoretic CAPM, ls  lm  rsm  r2m. The ﬁnal step uses the identity r2sm ¼ r2s  2rsm þ r2m, where
s  m is the vector of diﬀerences in the returns: s m ¼ ðs1  m1; . . . ; sN  mN Þ.
So when an investor holds a ﬁxed portfolio or follows some other strategy that can be sold short, we should
expect
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N
lnW m  1N lnW s 
1
2
r2sm; ð8Þand even when s cannot be sold short, we should expect1
N
lnW m  1N lnW s’
1
2
r2sm: ð9ÞIn words: s’s average logarithmic return can be expected to fall short of m’s by approximately r2sm=2, or by
even more if there are diﬃculties in short selling. The approximation (8) is made precise by Proposition 4, and
the approximate inequality (9) is made precise by Proposition 2.
We call r2sm=2 the theoretical performance deﬁcit for s. If we consider the market index m a maximally
diversiﬁed portfolio, then s’s theoretical performance deﬁcit can be attributed to insuﬃcient diversiﬁcation.
It is natural to decompose the vector of simple returns s into a part in the direction of the vector m and a
part orthogonal to m: s ¼ bsmþ e. Then we have s m ¼ ðbs  1Þmþ e, andr2sm ¼ ðbs  1Þ2r2m þ r2e :
Thus s’s theoretical performance deﬁcit, r2sm=2, decomposes into two parts:deficit due to nonunit sensitivity to m :
1
2
ðbs  1Þ2r2m; ð10Þanddeficit due to volatility orthogonal to m :
1
2
r2e : ð11ÞThese two parts of the deﬁcit represent two aspects of insuﬃcient diversiﬁcation. Many other decompositions
of r2sm=2 are possible, corresponding to events inside and outside the market. Such decompositions may be
useful for analyzing and comparing the performance of diﬀerent mutual funds, especially funds that do try
to track the market.
There is nothing in our theory that would require the theoretical performance deﬁcit of a particular security
or portfolio to persist from one period of time to another. On the contrary, a persistence that is too predictable
and substantial would give a speculator an opportunity to beat the market by shorting that security or port-
folio, thus contradicting our eﬃcient market hypothesis. But in the case of an investor or fund whose strategy
cannot be shorted because it is not public information, persistence of the theoretical performance deﬁcit or
certain components of that deﬁcit cannot be ruled out. It would be interesting to study the extent to which
such persistence occurs.
2. The geometric intuition
In this section, we explain the geometric intuition that underlies the game-theoretic CAPM. This explana-
tion will be repeated in a terser and more formal way in the proofs in Appendix B.
We begin with what we call the capital market parabola for m: the curve in the (r,l)-plane consisting of all
volatility–return pairs that yield approximately the same ﬁnal wealth as m. The eﬃcient market hypothesis for
m says that the volatility–return pair for the simple returns s achieved by any given investor should fall under
the capital market parabola for m, as should the volatility–return pair for any particular mixture of m and s. In
order for this to be true for mixtures that contain mostly m and only a little s, the trajectory traced by the
volatility–return pair as s’s share in the mixture approaches zero must be approximately tangent to the parab-
ola. The formula that expresses this conclusion is our CAPM: ls  lm  r2m þ rsm. The conclusion requires
that short selling of s be possible, so that the mixture can include a negative amount of s; otherwise we can
conclude only that the trajectory cannot approach the parabola from above, and this yields only
ls/ lm  r2m þ rsm.
There are two sources of inexactness. First, the capital market parabola is only approximately an indiﬀer-
ence curve for total wealth; this is the fundamental approximation. Second, the eﬃcient market hypothesis for
m is itself only approximately correct.
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As we saw in Section 1.3, a speculator who is concerned only with his ﬁnal wealth will be roughly indiﬀerent
between volatility–return pairs that have the same value of l 1
2
r2—i.e., volatility–return pairs that lie on the
same parabola l ¼ 1
2
r2 þ c. Fig. 1 depicts two parabolas of this form in the half-plane consisting of (r,l) with
r > 0. The parabola that lies higher in the ﬁgure corresponds to a higher level of ﬁnal wealth.
The eﬃcient market hypothesis for the market index m implies that the volatility–return pair achieved by a
particular investor should lie approximately on or below the ﬁnal wealth parabola on which (rm,lm) lies. This
is the parabolaFig. 1.
concer
such p
capital
l = r r
r are ml ¼ 1
2
r2 þ lm 
1
2
r2m
 
;the capital market parabola (CMP) for m.
In general, the parabola that goes through the volatility–return pair for a particular security or portfolio s,l ¼ 1
2
r2 þ ls 
1
2
r2s
 
; ð12Þintersects the l-axis at ls  12 r2s . Because this is the constant simple return that gives approximately the same
ﬁnal wealth as s, we call it s’s volatility-free equivalent.
Strictly speaking, a constant simple return l does not have zero volatility when we use the uncentered def-
inition; its volatility isr :¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
N
XN
n¼1
l2
vuut ¼ jlj:
This is why the indiﬀerence curves in Fig. 1 do not quite reach the l-axis; they stop at the line l = r above the
r-axis and at the line l = r below the r-axis. But the height of parabola (12)’s intersection with this line will
be practically the same as the height of its intersection with the l-axis.
2.2. Mixing s and m: the long CAPM
Suppose the speculator maintains a portfolio p that mixes s and m, say  of s and (1  ) of m, where
0 6  6 1. (He rebalances at the beginning of every period so that s always accounts for the fraction  ofIndiﬀerence curves in the (r,l)-plane. Each curve is a parabola of the form l ¼ 1
2
r2 þ c for some constant c. A speculator who is
ned only with ﬁnal wealth will be approximately indiﬀerent between two portfolios whose volatility–return pairs lie on the same
arabola. This ﬁgure also illustrates two additional points: (1) The indiﬀerence curve on which the market index m lies is called the
market parabola (CMP). (2) Because the minimum uncentered volatility r compatible with a positive average return l is l, the line
epresents the left-most boundary of the indiﬀerence curves in the positive quadrant. This line appears almost vertical because l and
easured on very diﬀerent scales; for a typical pair (r,l), r2 and l are of the same order of magnitude, and so r is much larger than l.
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below the CMP no matter what the value of  is. As  varies between 0 and 1, (rp,lp) traces a trajectory, per-
haps as indicated in Fig. 2. We haveFig. 2.
returnlp ¼ ls þ ð1 Þlm ð13Þ
andrp ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2r2s þ 2ð1 Þrsm þ ð1 Þ2r2m
q
: ð14ÞHence
olp
o j¼0 ¼ ls  lm and orpo j¼0 ¼ rsmr
2
m
rm
(cf. [6, p. 197]). If the second of these two derivatives is nonzero,
then their ratio,ls  lm
ðrsm  r2mÞ=rm
; ð15Þis the slope of the tangent to the trajectory at (rm,lm).
Our goal here is to give a preliminary informal proof of the long CAPM—i.e., to understand whyls  lm 6 rsm  r2m ð16Þ
should hold approximately. To this end, we consider four cases:
(1) ls  lm 6 0 and rsm  r2m P 0;
(2) ls  lmP 0 and rsm  r2m 6 0, but not both are equal to 0;
(3) ls  lm > 0 and rsm  r2m > 0;
(4) ls  lm < 0 and rsm  r2m < 0.
Any two real numbers are related to each other in one of these four ways.
In Case 1, we obtain (16) immediately: a nonpositive quantity cannot exceed a nonnegative one. Fig. 2 is an
example of this case. We see from the ﬁgure that ls is below lm, and that the trajectory approaches (rm,lm)
from the southeast. So ls  lm is strictly negative and the slope (15) is negative; it follows that rsm  r2m is
positive.
Case 2 is ruled out by the eﬃcient market hypothesis for m. It tells us that ls is at least as large as lm, and
because lp changes monotonically with , this means that the trajectory must approach (rm,lm) from above or
the side. It also tells us that the slope (15) is negative unless one of the quantities is zero. So the trajectory
approaches (rm, lm) from the northwest (directly from the west if ls  lm ¼ 0, directly from the north if
rsm  r2m ¼ 0). This means approaching (rm, lm) from above the CMP, in contradiction to our eﬃcient market
hypothesis.
In Case 3, the slope of the trajectory at (rm,lm) is positive, and the trajectory approaches (rm,lm) from the
northeast. Because the trajectory must lie under the CMP, its slope at (rm,lm) cannot exceed the CMP’s slope
at (rm,lm), which is rm:Mixing m with an underperforming portfolio s. The curve joining (rm,lm) and (rs,ls) is the trajectory traced by the volatility–
pair for the portfolio s + (1  )m as  varies from 0 to 1.
Fig. 3.
implies
specula
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ðrsm  r2mÞ=rm
6 rm:Multiplying both sides by the denominator, we obtain (16).
Case 4 is similar to Case 3; the slope is again positive, but now the approach is from the southwest, and so
staying under the CMP requires that the slope be at least as great:ls  lm
ðrsm  r2mÞ=rm
P rm:This time the denominator is negative, and so multiplying both sides by it again yields (16).
2.3. The capital market line
We should pause to note that the approximate inequality that we have just argued for,ls/ lm  r2m þ rsm; ð17Þ
implies a strengthening of the statement that (rs,ls) should be approximately on or below the capital market
parabola in the (r,l)-plane. This pair should also be approximately on or below the line tangent to this parab-
ola at (rm,lm). (See Fig. 3.)
To see this, it suﬃces to rewrite (17) in the formls/ lm  r2m þ qsmrmrs;
where qsm is the uncentered correlation coeﬃcient between s and m. Because qsm 6 1, this impliesls/ lm  r2m þ rmrs: ð18Þ
In other words, (rs,ls) must lie approximately on or below the linel ¼ ðlm  r2mÞ þ rmr: ð19Þ
This line, which we call the capital market line (CML), is the tangent to the CMP at (rm,lm).
2.4. Shorting s to go longer in m: The long–short CAPM
If our speculator is allowed to short s in order to go longer in m, then he can take  past zero into negative
territory. This means extending the trajectory in the direction it is pointing as it approaches (rm,lm).
We evidently have a problem if the trajectory approaches the CMP as in Fig. 2. In such a case, extending
the trajectory past (rm,lm) by going short in s a small amount  means extending the trajectory above the
CMP, in contradiction to our eﬃcient market hypothesis. So such trajectories are ruled out when the specu-
lator is allowed to sell s short.The capital market line (CML). This is the line tangent to the capital market parabola at (rm,lm). Our eﬃcient market hypothesis
that the volatility–return pair for a particular security or portfolio s should fall approximately on or below this line, even when a
tor cannot sell s short.
Fig. 4. A trajectory for the long–short case. In the long–short case, the trajectory traced by the volatility–return pair for s + (1  )m as 
varies from 0 to 1 must (1) approach (rm,lm) directly from the east, or (2) be tangent to the CMP (and therefore also to the CML) at
(rm,lm). In this ﬁgure, it is tangent and approaches from the northeast. It could also approach from the southwest.
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above the CMP:
(1) If the partial derivatives of (13) and (14) are both zero, then selling s short by a small amount  will have
no ﬁrst-order eﬀect; the pair (rp,lp) will remain approximately equal to (rm,lm).
(2) If the trajectory is approximately tangent to the CMP at (rm,lm), as in Fig. 4, then the speculator will
remain under the CMP even if he can extend the trajectory a small amount past (rm,lm).
The long–short CAPM,ls  lm  r2m þ rsm;
holds under both conditions. It holds under the ﬁrst condition because ls  lm and rsm  r2m are both zero. It
holds under the second condition because the slope (15) is approximately rm.
It may be helpful to elaborate some further implications of the ﬁrst of the two conditions. From
ls  lm ¼ 0, we ﬁnd that lp is constant: lp = ls = lm. From rsm  r2m ¼ 0, we ﬁnd that s ¼ mþ e, where e
is orthogonal to m, so that p ¼ mþ e and r2p ¼ r2m þ 2r2e . Geometrically, this means that the trajectory
approaches (rm, lm) directly from the east as  moves from 1 down to 0, and then eventually moves directly
back east as  moves substantially into negative territory.
3. Quantifying our eﬃcient market hypotheses
No matter what market, what period of time, and what index m we choose, we can retrospectively ﬁnd
strategies and perhaps even securities that do beat m by a substantial factor. A strategy that shifts at the begin-
ning of each day to those securities that increase in price the most that day will usually beat any index spec-
tacularly. So what do we mean when we say that a speculator cannot beat m by a substantial factor? We mean
that we do not expect any particular speculator (or any particular security, portfolio, or strategy selected in
advance) to do much better than the market. We do not expect the speculator’s ﬁnal wealth to exceed by a
large factor the ﬁnal wealth that he would have achieved simply by investing his initial wealth in the market
index m. The larger the factor, the stronger our expectation. If a is a positive number very close to zero, and
the speculator starts with initial wealth equal to one monetary unit, then we strongly expect his ﬁnal wealth
will be less than 1aW m, whereWm is the ﬁnal wealth obtained by investing one monetary unit in m at the outset.
This is an expectation about the market’s behavior: the market will follow a course that makes the speculator’s
wealth less than 1aW m.
In this section, we review some ideas from [3], where this way of quantifying eﬃcient market hypotheses is
given a natural game-theoretic foundation. In Section 3.1, we formulate the basic capital asset pricing game
(basic CAPG). In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we discuss how this game, in itself only a mathematical object, can
be used to model securities markets. In Section 3.4, we deﬁne two variations on the basic CAPG, which
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that we present later, in Section 4.
3.1. The basic capital asset pricing game
The capital asset pricing game has two principal players, SPECULATOR and MARKET, who alternate play. In
each round, SPECULATOR decides how much of each security in the market to hold (and possibly short), and
then MARKET determines SPECULATOR’s gain by deciding how the prices of the securities change. Allied with
MARKET is a third player, INVESTOR, who also invests each day. The game is a perfect-information game: each
player sees the others’ moves.
We assume that there are K + 1 securities in the market and N rounds (trading periods) in the game. We
number the securities from 0 to K and the rounds from 1 to N, and we write xkn for the simple return on security
k in round n. For simplicity, we assume that 1 < xkn <1 for all k and n; a security price never becomes zero.
We write xn for the vector ðx0n; . . . ; xKn Þ, which lies in (1,1)K+1. MARKET determines the returns; xn is his move
in the nth round. We assume that the ﬁrst security, indexed by 0, is our market index m; thus x0n is the same as
mn, the simple return of the market index m in round n. If m is a portfolio formed from the other securities,
then x0n is an average of the x
1
n; . . . ; x
K
n , but we do not insist on this.
We writeMn for the wealth at the end of round n resulting from investing one monetary unit in m at the
beginning of the game:Mn :¼
Yn
i¼1
ð1þ x0i Þ ¼
Yn
i¼1
ð1þ miÞ:ThusMn is the ﬁnal wealth resulting from this investment. This is the quantity we earlier designated by Wm.
INVESTOR begins with capital equal to one monetary unit and is allowed to redistribute his current capi-
tal across all K + 1 securities in each round. If we write Gn for his wealth at the end of the nth round,
thenGn :¼
Yn
i¼1
XK
k¼0
gki ð1þ xki Þ;where gki is the fraction of his wealth he holds in security k during the ith round. This is negative if he is selling
k short. The gki must sum to 1 over k. INVESTOR’s ﬁnal wealth is GN . Thus GN is the same as what we earlier
called Ws. We will also write sn for INVESTOR’s simple return in round n:sn :¼ Gn  Gn1
Gn1
¼
X
k
gknx
k
n: ð20ÞWe call the set of all possible sequences (g1, x1, . . ., gN, xN) the sample space of the game, and we designate it
by X. We call any subset of X an event. Any statement about INVESTOR’s returns determines an event, as does
any comparison of INVESTOR’s and MARKET’s returns.
SPECULATOR also starts with one monetary unit and is allowed to redistribute his current capital across all
K + 1 securities in each round. We write Hn for his wealth at the end of the nth round:Hn :¼
Yn
i¼1
XK
k¼0
hki ð1þ xki Þ;where hki is the fraction of his wealth he holds in security k during the ith round. The moves by SPECULATOR are
not recorded in the sample space; they do not deﬁne events.
To complete the speciﬁcation of the game, we select a number a and an event A, and we agree that
SPECULATOR will win the game if he beats the index by the factor 1a or if A happens. The number a is
our signiﬁcance level, and the event A is SPECULATOR’s auxiliary goal. This auxiliary goal might, for exam-
ple, be the event that INVESTOR’s average simple return ls approximates lm  r2m þ rsm to some speciﬁed
accuracy.
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Players: INVESTOR, MARKET, SPECULATOR
Parameters:
Natural number K (number of non-index securities in the market)
Natural number N (number of rounds or trading periods)
Real number a satisfying 0 < a 6 1 (signiﬁcance level)
A  X (auxiliary goal)
Protocol:
G0 :¼ 1.
H0 :¼ 1.
M0 :¼ 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . ., N: PINVESTOR selects gn 2 RKþ1 such that Kk¼0gkn ¼ 1.
SPECULATOR selects hn 2 RKþ1 such that
PK
k¼0h
k
n ¼ 1.
MARKET selects xn 2 (1,1)K+1.
Gn :¼ Gn1
PK
k¼0g
k
nð1þ xknÞ.
Hn :¼Hn1
PK
k¼0h
k
nð1þ xknÞ.
Mn :¼Mn1ð1þ x0nÞ.
Winner: SPECULATOR wins if Hn P 0 for n = 1, . . ., N and either (1) HN P 1aMN or (2)
(g1, x1, . . ., gN, xN) 2 A. Otherwise INVESTOR and MARKET win.
The requirement that SPECULATOR keepHn nonnegative in order to win formalizes the idea that he has limited
means. It ensures that whenHN P 1aMN , he really has turned an initial capital of only one monetary unit into
1
aMN . If he were allowed to continue on to the (n + 1)st round whenHn < 0, he would be borrowing money—
i.e., drawing on a larger capital—and if he then ﬁnally achievedHN P 1aMN , it would not be fair to credit him
with doing sowith his limited initial means of only onemonetary unit. Because SPECULATORmust keepHn always
nonnegative in order towin, a strategy for SPECULATOR cannot guarantee hiswinning if it permits the other players
to forceHn < 0 for some n. In other words, a winning strategy for SPECULATOR cannot risk bankruptcy.
Formally, the basic CAPG allows SPECULATOR to sell securities short. However, if SPECULATOR sells security
k short in round n, then MARKET has the option of making the return xkn so large thatHn becomes negative,
resulting in SPECULATOR’s immediately losing the game. So no winning strategy for SPECULATOR can involve
short selling. In Section 3.4, we discuss how the rules of the game can be modiﬁed to make short selling a real
possibility for SPECULATOR.
3.2. Predictions from the eﬃcient market hypothesis
In order for SPECULATOR to win our game, either he must become very rich relative to the market index m
(he beats m by the factor 1a) or else the event A must happen. In the next section, we will show that for certain
choices of A and a, SPECULATOR can win—he has a winning strategy. But our eﬃcient market hypothesis pre-
dicts that the market will not allow him to become very rich relative to m, and this implies that A will happen.
In this sense, our eﬃcient market hypothesis predicts that A will happen.
To formalize this idea, we make the following deﬁnition: The eﬃcient market hypothesis for m predicts the
event A at level a if Speculator has a winning strategy in the basic CAPG with A as the auxiliary goal and a as
the signiﬁcance level.
As we explained earlier, our conﬁdence that SPECULATOR will not beat the market by 1a is greater for smaller
a. So a prediction of A at level a becomes more emphatic as a decreases.
3.3. Is the game realistic?
We relate the game to an actual securities market by thinking of INVESTOR as a particular individual
investor or fund. INVESTOR may do whatever a real investor may do: he may follow some particular
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egy; or he may play opportunistically, without any strategy chosen in advance. MARKET represents all the
other participants in the market. Because MARKET and INVESTOR play the game as a team against
SPECULATOR, we can even think of MARKET as representing all the participants in the market, including
INVESTOR.
SPECULATOR need not represent a real investor. He represents the hypothetical investor referred to by our
eﬃcient market hypothesis: he cannot multiply his initial capital by a substantial factor relative to the index m.
We have SPECULATOR move after INVESTOR so that he knows what INVESTOR is doing with his capital and can
replicate it with part of his own capital.
The winning strategies for SPECULATOR that we construct to prove our propositions are simple: SPECULATOR
mixes INVESTOR’s moves with m, perhaps going short in INVESTOR’s moves to go longer in m. Because these
simple strategies are suﬃcient, the eﬃcient market hypothesis that we need in order to draw our practical con-
clusions from the propositions is sometimes relatively weak. Instead of assuming that no speculator can beat
the market by a large factor, no matter how smart and imaginative he is, it is enough to assume that no spec-
ulator can beat m by a large factor using strategies at most slightly more complicated than those used by the
investors or funds whose performance we are studying.3.4. The long and long–short capital asset pricing games
We do not actually use the basic CAPG for our mathematical work in the next section. Instead, we use two
variations, which we call the long CAPG and the long–short CAPG.
Both the long CAPG and the long–short CAPG are obtained from the basic CAPG by restricting how the
players can move:
• The long CAPG is obtained by replacing the condition gn 2 RKþ1 in the protocol for the basic CAPG by the
condition gn 2 [0,1)K+1. In other words, INVESTOR is forbidden to sell securities short.
• The long–short CAPG has two extra parameters: a positive constant C (perhaps very large), and a constant
d 2 (0,1) (perhaps very small). It is obtained by replacing the condition gn 2 RKþ1 in the protocol for the
basic CAPG by the condition gn 2 [0,1)K+1 and replacing the condition xn 2 (1,1)K+1 by the conditions
xn 2 (1,C]K+1 and mn P 1þ d. (Remember that mn ¼ x0n.) In other words, INVESTOR is not allowed to sell
short, and MARKET is constrained so that an individual security cannot increase too much in value in a sin-
gle round and the market index m cannot lose too much of its value in a single round. These constraints on
INVESTOR and MARKET make it possible for SPECULATOR to go short in INVESTOR’s moves, at least a bit, with-
out risking bankruptcy.
The concept of prediction is deﬁned for these games just as for the basic CAPG: The eﬃcient market
hypothesis for m predicts A at level a for one of the games if SPECULATOR has a winning strategy in that game
with A as the auxiliary goal and a as the signiﬁcance level. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2 we show that certain events
are predicted at level a in the long CAPG. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 we show that certain events are predicted at
level a in the long–short CAPG.
Because MARKET remains unconstrained in the long CAPG, the lesson we learned for the basic CAPG at
the end of Section 3.1 applies: No winning strategy for SPECULATOR can go short, because MARKET can
bankrupt him whenever he does go short. This will be conﬁrmed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2; the strategies for
SPECULATOR used there never go short. These strategies do need to go long in INVESTOR’s move, and this is
why the condition that INVESTOR not sell short is needed as a rule of the long game. An alternative way of
making sure that SPECULATOR can go long in INVESTOR’s move without risking bankruptcy would be to make
it a rule of the game that INVESTOR and MARKET must move so that INVESTOR never goes bankrupt: they would
be required to choose gn and xn so that sn >  1 (see Eq. (20)).
We can similarly weaken the constraints on INVESTOR and MARKET in the long–short CAPG: Require
only that (1) mn P 1þ d (the market index never drops too much in a single round) and (2) 1 < sn 6 C
(INVESTOR never becomes bankrupt and never makes too great a return in a single round).
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We now state four propositions that express precisely, within the game-theoretic framework, the assertions
that we outlined informally in Section 1. Proofs of these propositions are provided in Appendix B.
To simplify the statement of the propositions, we deﬁne functions U and / byUðxÞ :¼ 1
3
x3 and /ðxÞ :¼ 1
3
x
1þ x
 3
:4.1. The long CAPM
Our ﬁrst proposition translates the approximate inequality that we call the long CAPM, Eq. (2), into a pre-
cise inequality.
Proposition 1. For any a 2 (0,1] and any  2 (0,1], the efficient market hypothesis for m predictsls  lm þ r2m  rsm <
E

þ ln
1
a
N
þ r
2
sm
2
ð21Þat level a in the long CAPG, whereE :¼ 1
N
XN
n¼1
UðmnÞ  /ðð1 Þmn þ snÞð Þ: ð22ÞThe quantity E bounds the accuracy of the fundamental approximation. It is awkwardly complicated because
we have made the bound as tight as possible. In theory, E can be negative, but it is typically positive, and cer-
tainly the right-hand side of (21) as a whole is typically positive.
Although Proposition 1 is valid as stated, for any natural number N, any a 2 (0,1], and any  2 (0,1], its
theoretical signiﬁcance is greatest when these parameters are chosen so that the right-hand side of (21) is small
in absolute value relative to the typical size of the individual terms on the left-hand side, ls; lm; r
2
m, and rsm.
When this is so, (21) can be read roughly as ls  lm þ r2m  rsm/ 0, or ls/lm  r2m þ rsm.
In this paragraph, we will use the phrase relatively small to mean ‘‘small in absolute value relative to the
typical size of ls; lm; r
2
m, and rsm’’. In order for the right-hand side of (21) to be relatively small, we need
all three of its terms to be relatively small. To see what this involves, let us look at these three terms
individually:
• The theoretical performance deﬁcit r2sm=2, which measures s’s lack of diversiﬁcation, is typically of the
same order of magnitude as ls; lm; r
2
m, and rsm. So we need to make  small.
• To make our eﬃcient market hypothesis realistic, we must choose a signiﬁcantly less than one. So in order
to make the term lnð1=aÞN relatively small, we must make the number of rounds N large even relative to 1/.
Because the typical size of ls; lm; r
2
m, and rsm decrease when the time period for each round is made shorter,
it is not enough to make N large by making these individual time periods short. We must make the total
period of time studied long.
• Once we have chosen a small , we must make E extremely small in order to make E/ relatively small.
Because E is essentially the diﬀerence between two averages of the third moments of the returns, we can
make it extremely small by making the individual trading periods suﬃciently short.
To summarize, we can hope to get a tight bound in (21) only if we choose  small and consider frequent
returns (perhaps daily returns) over a long period of time.
These points can be made much more clearly by a more formal analysis of the asymptotics. Fix arbitrarily
small a > 0 and  > 0. (We make  small because we need it small; we make a small to show that we can tolerate
it small.) Suppose trading happens during an interval of time [0,T] that is split into N subintervals of length
dt = T/N, and let T !1 and dt! 0. We can expect that sn and mn will have the order of magnitude (dt)1/2, E
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2
m; rsm; r
2
sm will all have the order of magnitude dt; this
holds both in the usual theory of diﬀusion processes and in the game-theoretic framework (for a partial expla-
nation, see [3, Chapter 9]). So the right-hand side of (21) will not exceed OððdtÞ3=2 þ dtT Þ þ r
2
sm
2
. For small
enough , this should be much less than dt, the typical order of magnitude for ls;lm; r
2
m, and rsm.
The data we consider in Section 5 are only monthly and cover only a few decades, and so they do not allow
us to achieve the happy results suggested by these extreme asymptotics. In fact, the tightest bounds we can
achieve with these data occur when we choose  relatively large.
4.2. The theoretical performance deﬁcit for long markets
The next proposition is a precise statement about the theoretical performance deﬁcit r2sm=2.
Proposition 2. For any a 2 (0,1] and any  2 (0,1], the efficient market hypothesis for m predicts that
1
N
lnW s  1N lnW m þ
1
2
r2sm <
E1

þ E2 þ
ln 1a
N
þ 
2
r2smat level a in the long CAPG, whereE1 :¼ 1N
XN
n¼1
UðmnÞ  /ðð1 Þmn þ snÞð ÞandE2 :¼ 1N
XN
n¼1
UðsnÞ  /ðmnÞð Þ:This time we have broken the error stemming from the fundamental approximation into two parts. The ﬁrst part,
E1/, usually increases as  is made smaller, while the second part, E2, is not aﬀected by .
Again, we aim to choose a and  so that a deﬁnes a reasonable eﬃcient market hypothesis but the total
error, in this caseE1

þ E2 þ
ln 1a
N
þ 
2
r2sm; ð23Þis small. When this is achieved, the proposition says that 1N lnW s  1N lnW m þ 12 r2sm/ 0, or
1
N
lnW m  1N lnW s’
1
2
r2sm:In order for this to validate the theoretical performance deﬁcit r2sm=2 as a measure of s’s performance, we
need the error (23) to be small relative to all three terms in this approximate inequality. This evidently requires
 itself to be small. When  = 1, (23) is larger than r2sm=2.
4.3. The long–short CAPM
Now we turn to the long–short case.
Proposition 3. For any  2 ð0; d1þCÞ and a 2 (0,1], the efficient market hypothesis for m predicts thatls  lm þ r2m  rsm
  < E

þ ln
2
a
N
þ 
2
r2smat level a in the long–short CAPG with parameters C and d, whereE :¼ max
j2f1;1g
1
N
XN
n¼1
UðmnÞ  /ðð1 jÞmn þ jsnÞð Þ:
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Proposition 4. For any a 2 (0,1] and any  2 ð0; d1þCÞ, the efficient market hypothesis for m predicts
1
N
lnW s  1N lnW m þ
1
2
r2sm
  < E1 þ E2 þ ln 2aN þ 2 r2sm
at level a in the long–short CAPG, whereE1 :¼ max
j2f1;1g
1
N
XN
n¼1
UðmnÞ  /ðð1 jÞmn þ jsnÞð ÞandE2 :¼ max 1N
XN
n¼1
UðsnÞ  /ðmnÞð Þ; 1N
XN
n¼1
UðmnÞ  /ðsnÞð Þ
 !
:5. Some empirical examples
In this section, we check the game-theoretic CAPM’s predictions against data on returns over three or four
decades for a few well known stocks. We also investigate what the game-theoretic CAPM says about the
equity premium by looking at two much longer sequences of returns for government and commercial bonds,
one for the United States and one for Britain. All our tests use monthly data, with signiﬁcance level a = 0.5,
corresponding to the hypothesis that SPECULATOR cannot do twice as well as the market index m, and mixing
coeﬃcient  = 1.
Empirical tests of the classical CAPM do not emphasize returns on individual stocks. The classical CAPM
cannot be tested at all until it is combined with additional hypotheses about the variability of individual secu-
rities, and in order to avoid putting the weight of a test on these additional hypotheses, one emphasizes port-
folios, sometimes across entire industries, instead of individual securities. Moreover, even studies on returns
from portfolios tend to be inconclusive, because of the substantial remaining variability orthogonal to the
market and because the additional hypotheses still play a large role. Because the eﬃcient market hypothesis
is much weaker than the assumptions that go into the classical CAPM, we do not expect the game-theoretic
CAPM to provide tighter bounds than the classical CAPM. So in order to ﬁnd examples where the game-the-
oretic CAPM provides reasonably tight bounds on the relation between average return and volatility, or where
the theoretical performance deﬁcit provides an interesting bound on performance, we will probably need to
look at large portfolios.
Moreover, the asymptotic analysis in Section 4.1 suggests that we will need to look at longer periods of
time, perhaps with data sampled daily, in order to get tight bounds. And even a good understanding of
how often the eﬃcient market hypothesis at a given signiﬁcance level is valid for individual securities in a given
market would require a comprehensive and careful study, with due attention to survivorship bias and other
biases.
This section should, however, make clear how our results can be applied to data. It shows the kinds of
bounds that the game-theoretic CAPM can achieve with no assumptions beyond the level a for the eﬃcient
market hypothesis.5.1. Twelve stocks
The 12 stocks we now consider are listed in Table 1. They are hardly a random or representative sample.
We chose them because of their familiarity. We did choose them, however, before making the calculations
shown here; no other companies were chosen and then omitted because of the results they gave. As the market
index m, we use the S&P 500. Our data are from Yahoo.
Table 1
The 12 stocks
Company Ticker code Time period N
IBM IBM January 1962–June 2001 473
General Electric GE January 1962–June 2001 473
Microsoft MSFT March 1986–June 2001 183
Boeing BA January 1970–June 2001 377
Du Pont (E.I.) de Nemours DD January 1970–June 2001 377
Consolidated Edison ED January 1970–June 2001 377
Eastman Kodak EK January 1970–June 2001 377
General Motors GM January 1970–June 2001 377
Procter and Gamble PG January 1970–June 2001 377
Sears/Roebuck S January 1970–June 2001 377
AT&T T January 1970–June 2001 377
Texaco TX January 1970–June 2001 377
The number N, the number of monthly returns, is one less than the number of months for which we have data.
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is slightly diﬀerent than in the long case.
• In the long–short case, the choice  = 1 is theoretically problematic, because Propositions 3 and 4 require
 < d
1þC, while the values of d and C for which the returns from the companies would satisfy the conditions
of the long–short game would make d
1þC less than one. But it is nevertheless the most informative choice: (1)
it gives tighter bounds than any other  2 (0,1] for all 12 companies, and (2) these tightest bounds are sat-
isﬁed by most of the 12 companies, and this makes it clear that they are also satisﬁed for other choices of .
It is also true that d can be chosen close enough to 1 and C close enough to 0 that  can be made close
enough to 1 as to produce legitimate bounds approximately equal to the ones we obtain for  = 1.
• In the long case, the choice  = 1 is theoretically allowed. It does not always produce the tightest bounds,
but the diﬀerence is never very great, and there is no clear rationale for choosing any other particular value
of  in advance of seeing the data.
With a = 0.5 and  = 1, the CAPM inequalities are:
• Long–short CAPM inequality (Proposition 3) with a = 0.5 and  = 1ls  lm þ r2m  rsm
  < E þ 2 ln 2
N
þ 1
2
r2sm:• Long CAPM inequality (Proposition 1) with a = 0.5 and  = 1ls  lm þ r2m  rsm < E þ
ln 2
N
þ 1
2
r2sm:(Remember that both E and N depend on the stock, and E is not the same in the long as in the long–short
case.) In Table 2, we report numerical values for these inequalities for our 12 companies.
Microsoft and Sears are the only stocks for which our bounds do not hold. Microsoft’s spectacular perfor-
mance violated both the long–short inequality (which reduces to 266.6 < 142.9 in this case) and the long
inequality (which reduces to 266.6 < 97.1). Sears’s impressive underperformance violated the long–short
inequality (68.0 < 65.5) but not, of course, the long inequality (68.0 < 47.1). Both performances can reason-
ably be put into the category of unusual events that could not have been anticipated, and for this reason the
violations do not make us uncomfortable with our eﬃcient market hypothesis. One other stock, AT&T, also
falls outside our expectations. Our bounds hold for this stock, but the error in the fundamental approximation
(E = 217.3) is so great that these bounds are uninteresting; this error seems to be the result of a fall in share
price from 32.52 to 8.34 in a single month, February 1984.
Table 2
CAPM empirical results
Code (Ws/Wm) ls lm r2m rsm LHS RHS E
1
N 2 ln 2
1
2r
2
sm
IBM (0.23) 83.1 99.4 19.6 18.7 15.4 46.2 (31.4) 0.6 (0.4) 29.3 16.3
GE (0.91) 108.9 99.4 19.6 22.6 6.4 38.6 (23.5) 0.4 (0.0) 29.3 8.9
MSFT (50.3) 401.8 121.7 21.6 35.1 266.6 142.9 (97.1) 8.1 (0.2) 75.8 59.0
BA (1.7) 161.8 110.6 21.2 24.1 48.2 76.6 (54.9) 4.4 (1.1) 36.8 35.4
DD (0.76) 116.9 110.6 21.2 20.1 7.4 53.0 (33.9) 1.2 (0.4) 36.8 15.0
ED (1.3) 133.2 110.6 21.2 10.3 33.5 77.0 (54.9) 15.4 (11.7) 36.8 24.8
EK (0.12) 67.2 110.6 21.2 16.2 38.4 56.7 (38.3) 1.6 (1.6) 36.8 18.4
GM (0.32) 97.6 110.6 21.2 19.0 10.8 57.6 (39.2) 1.1 (1.1) 36.8 19.7
PG (0.43) 97.3 110.6 21.2 15.3 7.4 53.1 (34.8) 1.5 (1.5) 36.8 14.8
S (0.032) 42.2 110.6 21.2 20.7 68.0 65.5 (47.1) 6.4 (6.4) 36.8 22.3
T (0.016) 31.1 110.6 21.2 15.3 73.6 280.8 (262.5) 217.3 (217.3) 36.8 26.7
TX (0.84) 117.2 110.6 21.2 14.9 12.9 56.6 (36.5) 1.5 (0.1) 36.8 18.2
USA (0.0031) 36.2 84.7 23.7 0.3 25.1 35.6 (16.4) 15.0 (0.3) 8.9 11.7
UK (0.0097) 41.7 55.7 11.3 4.5 7.3 13.2 (8.0) 5.4 (0.2) 3.8 5.9
This table gives numerical values for the 12 stocks discussed in Section 5.1 and the two bond series discussed in Section 5.2. In parentheses
after the ticker code for the stock (or the abbreviation USA or UK) we give the ratio Ws/Wm, a direct measure of performance. All other
numerical values are in basis points (1 bp = 0.0001). The numbers not in parentheses are for the long–short inequality (Proposition 3).
LHS, with the minus signs removed, is the left-hand side of that inequality; RHS is the right-hand side. For the long inequality
(Proposition 1), use the values in parentheses for RHS and E, halve the value of 2 ln 2N , and restore the minus sign on the LHS.
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icance level a and for any other mixing coeﬃcient .
Now we consider how well the 12 companies satisfy the bounds our theory gives for the theoretical perfor-
mance deﬁcit (TPD). In this case, we are considering the following inequalities:
• Long-Short TPD Inequality (Proposition 4) with a = 0.5 and  = 1Table
TPD e
Code
IBM
GE
MSFT
BA
DD
ED
EK
GM
PG
S
T
TX
USA
UK
The sa1
N
lnW s  1N lnW m þ
1
2
r2sm
  < E1 þ E2 þ 2 ln 2N þ 12 r2sm:
• Long TPD Inequality (Proposition 2) with a = 0.5 and  = 11
N
lnW s  1N lnW m þ
1
2
r2sm < E1 þ E2 þ
ln 2
N
þ 1
2
r2sm:3
mpirical results
1
N lnW s
1
N lnW m
1
2r
2
sm LHS RHS E1 + E2
1
N 2 ln 2
1
2r
2
sm
58.3 89.6 16.3 15.0 47.0 (32.2) 1.4 (1.2) 29.3 16.3
87.7 89.6 8.9 7.0 39.4 (24.4) 1.3 (0.8) 29.3 8.9
324.9 110.8 59.0 273.2 152.4 (106.6) 17.6 (9.7) 75.8 59.0
114.7 100.1 35.4 50.0 79.6 (57.9) 7.4 (4.1) 36.8 35.4
92.8 100.1 15.0 7.7 53.8 (34.6) 2.0 (1.2) 36.8 15.0
107.7 100.1 24.8 32.5 88.7 (55.3) 27.1 (12.1) 36.8 24.8
43.0 100.1 18.4 38.7 58.2 (38.6) 3.1 (1.8) 36.8 18.4
69.6 100.1 19.7 10.7 58.7 (39.9) 2.2 (1.8) 36.8 19.7
77.6 100.1 14.8 7.7 54.7 (34.9) 3.1 (1.7) 36.8 14.8
8.4 100.1 22.3 69.3 71.8 (46.7) 12.8 (6.0) 36.8 22.3
9.4 100.1 26.7 82.7 498.2 (259.4) 434.7 (214.3) 36.8 26.7
95.6 100.1 18.2 13.8 57.9 (37.9) 2.9 (1.2) 36.8 18.2
36.1 73.0 11.7 25.3 35.9 (16.8) 15.4 (0.7) 8.9 11.7
37.4 50.2 6.0 6.9 16.0 (8.9) 6.3 (1.1) 3.8 5.9
me conventions are used as in the preceding table.
Table 4
The two bond series
American series British series
Code USA UK
Time period January 1871–June 2001 June 1700–June 2001
N 1565 3612
s Name USA Total Return Commercial/T-bill
Index
United Kingdom 10-year Government Bond Total
Return Index
GFD File TRUSABIM.csv TRGBRGVM.csv
m Name S&P 500 Composite Total Return
Index
UK FT-Actuaries All-Share Total Return Index
GFD File TRSPXM.csv _TFTASM.csv
These two series of bond returns were obtained from Global Financial Data (GFD). In the case of the British series, the GFD ﬁles listed
were supplemented by earlier data provided to us directly by GFD’s Bryan Taylor. Once again, the number N of monthly returns is one
less than the number of months for which we have data.
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when  = 1, and this is evident here from the fact that the deﬁcit appears on both sides of each inequality. We
can nevertheless look at the bounds as a check on our eﬃcient market hypothesis. Table 3 reports results for
the same companies and the same periods as Table 2. On the whole, the numbers are quite close to those in
Table 2, but this time only Microsoft violates the bounds.5.2. The equity premium
We can apply the game-theoretic CAPM to bonds as well as to stocks, provided that we adopt the appro-
priate eﬃcient market hypothesis: a speculator cannot substantially beat the index m when he is allowed to
hold (and also short, if we want to apply the long–short CAPM) both m and the bonds. We now report on
the results of applying the model to two series of bond returns, one American and one British. The sources
of our data are listed in Table 4, and our results are summarized in the last two rows of Tables 2 and 3.
The numbers in Table 2 conﬁrm the usual result that bonds fall below the security market line:
ls  lm þ r2m  rsm is negative for both series. For the American series, this CAPM deﬁcit is 25.1 bp, and
for the British series, it is 7.3bp. Because these values are negative, the long CAPM is automatically satisﬁed.
The long–short CAPM is also satisﬁed for both series (25.1 < 35.6 and 7.3 < 13.2). These are only the
results for a = 0.5 and  = 1, but because the error E in the fundamental approximation is substantial, chang-
ing these parameters will not make much diﬀerence. Table 3 shows that the TPD inequalities are also satisﬁed
by both series.
The amount by which bonds fall below the security market line can be thought of as the equity premium—a
premium paid for holding equity that has the same covariance with the market as bond. Our results show that
an equity premium may exist but that it remains within the bounds of our model and hence does not violate
our eﬃcient market hypothesis.
6. Discussion
The purpose of this article is to introduce, as clearly as possible, a completely game-theoretic capital asset
pricing model, derived from an eﬃcient market hypothesis alone, with no assumptions about the beliefs or
preferences of investors. The eﬃcient market hypothesis is very weak; as we have seen, it really says only that
a speculator cannot beat the market by a substantial factor using some rather obvious strategies. The predic-
tions of this game-theoretic model are loose, in the sense that they give fairly wide bounds on the relation
between average return and covariance with the market. But these bounds are themselves quite precise and
can therefore be tested with no auxiliary stochastic model for individual returns. Because of this precision,
the new game-theoretic model compares favorably with the classical CAPM, raising the question of whether
the classical model’s much stronger assumptions give it any greater predictive power. It also raises the question
194 V. Vovk, G. Shafer / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 49 (2008) 175–197of whether the established generalizations of the classical CAPM, which also rely on stochastic assumptions
and on assumptions about the beliefs and preferences of investors, are headed in the right direction. The game-
theoretic approach, which begins with an appropriate recognition of the role of speculation in governing the
market, may be more fruitful.
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Appendix A. Lower and upper probability
Starting with our notion of prediction at level a, we can recover the deﬁnitions of upper and lower prob-
ability mentioned in the introduction.
Prediction at level a being more emphatic when a is smaller, it is natural to code prediction at level a as
belief of strength 1  a. For example, when A is predicted at the 5% level, we might assert 95% belief in
A’s happening. Taking lower probability to be strength of belief in this sense leads to PA ¼ 1 aA, whereaA :¼ inffaj 0 < a 6 1 and EMH predicts A at level ag; ðA:1Þ
EMH being our eﬃcient market hypothesis. Roughly speaking (because the inﬁmum in (A.1) might not be
attained), this says that PA is the degree of belief corresponding to the smallest a such that A is predicted
at level a. Because SPECULATOR has a winning strategy for the goal A when a = 1 (buy and hold security 0),
we always have 0 6 aA 6 1 and hence 0 6 PA 6 1.
The relationship PA ¼ 1 PAc gives
PA ¼ inffaj 0 < a 6 1 and EMH predicts Ac at level ag
¼ inffaj 0 < a 6 1 and Speculator can multiply his capital by 1
a
without risking
bankruptcy if A happensg: ðA:2Þ
This agrees with the deﬁnition of upper probability in the introduction. It can be shown, using the fact that
SPECULATOR cannot make money for sure in the game, that PA 6 PA (see [3, pp. 14–15]).
We can restate Propositions 1–4 in terms of lower probability as follows:
Corollary 1. In the long CAPG,P ls  lm þ r2m  rsm <
E

þ ln
1
a
N
þ r
2
sm
2
 
P 1 aandP
1
N
lnW s  1N lnW m þ
1
2
r2sm <
E1

þ E2 þ
ln 1a
N
þ 
2
r2sm
 
P 1 a;for any a 2 (0,1] and any  2 (0,1], where E, E1, and E2 are defined as in the statements of Propositions 1 and 2.
In the long–short CAPG with parameters C and d,P ls  lm þ r2m  rsm
  < E

þ ln
2
a
N
þ r
2
sm
2
 
P 1 aandP
1
N
lnW s  1N lnW m þ
1
2
r2sm
  < E1 þ E2 þ ln 2aN þ 2 r2sm
 
P 1 a;
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1þCÞ, where E, E1, and E2 are defined as in the statements of Propositions 3 and
4.
These lower probability statements say exactly the same thing as Propositions 1–4: SPECULATOR has a win-
ning strategy in certain games.
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. First we study the accuracy of the fundamental approximation. When x >  1, we can
expand ln(1 + x) in a Taylor’s series with remainder:lnð1þ xÞ ¼ x 1
2
x2 þ 1
3
x3
1
ð1þ hxÞ3 ; ðB:1Þwhere h, which depends on x, satisﬁes 0 6 h 6 1. Since/ðxÞ 6 1
3
x3
1
ð1þ hxÞ3 6 UðxÞ;we can see that (B.1) implieslnð1þ xÞ 6 x 1
2
x2 þ UðxÞ ðB:2Þandlnð1þ xÞP x 1
2
x2 þ /ðxÞ: ðB:3ÞNotice that the functions U and / are monotonically increasing.
SPECULATOR has a trivial winning strategy in the long CAPG with any signiﬁcance level a and the auxiliary
goal YN
n¼1
ð1þ sn þ ð1 ÞmnÞ < 1a
YN
n¼1
ð1þ mnÞ:In each round, he invests  of his capital in s and 1   of his capital in m. But we can rewrite this auxiliary goal
as XN
n¼1
ðln 1þ sn þ ð1 ÞmnÞ  lnð1þ mnÞð Þ < ln 1a :This impliesXN
n¼1
sn þ ð1 Þmn  1
2
2s2n 
1
2
ð1 Þ2m2n  ð1 Þsnmn þ /ðsn þ ð1 ÞmnÞ  mn þ
1
2
m2n  UðmnÞ
 
< ln
1
aor XN
n¼1
 sn  mn þ m2n  snmn
 	 1
2
2 s2n þ m2n  2snmn
 	þ /ðsn þ ð1 ÞmnÞ  UðmnÞ  < ln 1a :This completes the proof. h
Proof of Proposition 2. Add the equalityr2sm
2
¼ r
2
s
2
þ r
2
m
2
 rsm ðB:4Þ
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N
lnW s  1N lnW m 6 ls 
1
2
r2s þ
1
N
XN
n¼1
UðsnÞ
 !
 lm 
1
2
r2m þ
1
N
XN
n¼1
/ðmnÞ
 !to the inequality in Proposition 1. h
Proof of Proposition 3. We know from Proposition 1 (see Corollary 1) thatP ls  lm þ r2m  rsm <
E

þ ln
2
a
N
þ r
2
sm
2
 
P 1 a
2
; ðB:5Þtherefore, it remains to proveP ls  lm þ r2m  rsm >
E
þ
ln 2a
Nþ
r2sm
2
 
P 1 a
2
: ðB:6Þ(Proposition 3 follows from (B.5), (B.6), and the inequalityPðA \ BÞP PðAÞ þ PðBÞ  1
from [3], Proposition 8.10.3 on p. 186.)
Consider a strategy for SPECULATOR in the long–short CAPG that calls for investing  of his capital in s
and investing 1 +  of his capital in m in every round. This strategy’s return in round n issn þ ð1þ Þmn P C þ ð1þ Þð1þ dÞ ¼ 1þ dþ ðC  1þ dÞ > 1þ dþ d
1þ C ðC  1Þ
¼ 1
(remember that  < d
1þC) and so it does not risk bankruptcy for SPECULATOR. It wins the game with the
signiﬁcance level a
2
and auxiliary goalYN
n¼1
1 sn þ ð1þ Þmnð Þ < 2a
YN
n¼1
ð1þ mnÞ;and the auxiliary goal can be transformed as follows (this is similar to the calculations in the Proof of
Proposition 1, with  replaced by ):XN
n¼1
ln 1 sn þ ð1þ Þmnð Þ  lnð1þmnÞð Þ < ln 2a ;XN
n¼1
sn þ ð1þ Þmn  1
2
2s2n 
1
2
ð1þ Þ2m2n þ ð1þ Þsnmn þ/ðsn þ ð1þ ÞmnÞ mn þ
1
2
m2n UðmnÞ
 
< ln
2
a
;
XN
n¼1
 sn mn þm2n  snmn
 	 1
2
2 s2n þm2n  2snmn
 	þ/ðð1þ Þmn  snÞ UðmnÞ  < ln 2a :This proves (B.6). h
Proof of Proposition 4. One half of this proposition is Proposition 2 (with a replaced by a
2
), and the other half is
obtained by adding (B.4) and1
N
lnW s  1N lnW m P ls 
1
2
r2s þ
1
N
XN
n¼1
/ðsnÞ
 !
 lm 
1
2
r2m þ
1
N
XN
n¼1
UðmnÞ
 !to the inner inequality in (B.6). h
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